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Abstract
In an Ultrafast Extreme Event (or Mini Flash Crash), the price of a traded
stock increases or decreases strongly within milliseconds. We present a detailed
study of Ultrafast Extreme Events in stock market data. In contrast to popular
belief, our analysis suggests that most of the Ultrafast Extreme Events are
not primarily due to High Frequency Trading. In at least 60 percent of the
observed Ultrafast Extreme Events, the main cause for the events are large
market orders. In times of financial crisis, large market orders are more likely
which can be linked to the significant increase of Ultrafast Extreme Events
occurrences. Furthermore, we analyze the 100 trades following each Ultrafast
Extreme Events. While we observe a tendency of the prices to partially recover,
less than 40 percent recover completely. On the other hand we find 25 percent
of the Ultrafast Extreme Events to be almost recovered after only one trade
which differs from the usually found price impact of market orders.
Keywords: Econophysics, Ultrafast Extreme Event, Flash Crash, High
Frequency Trading, Recovery Rate
1. Introduction
Within the last two decades, algorithmic trading gained in importance at
global stock markets [1, 2]. In contrast to conventional traders, algorithmic
traders automatically make trading decisions, place and observe orders [3]. The
algorithms that are used remain secret simply because front–running [4] needs
to be avoided. Consequently, not much literature is available about trading
algorithms. This increasing influence of algorithmic trading within the past
years prompted the installation of the ATP–flag (Automated Trader Program)
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as an indicator of algorithmic trading at the Xetra stock exchange [5]. Currently,
an equivalent tool indicating algorithmic trading is not available at US markets.
There are clear differences in human versus algorithmic trading behaviour. One
obvious advantage of algorithmic traders over humans is the quicker reaction
time, which for example can be exploited for high frequency arbitrage [6]. The
drastically increasing performance of networks and computers during the past
decades accelerates this progress [7, 8, 9]. Not surprisingly, High Frequency
Trading (HFT) is often being criticized by market participants as well as by the
media and in the political discussion [10, 11].
During the rise of algorithmic trading, a new challenge emerged in the form
of so called flash crashes, with large price changes in very short times [12, 13].
The flash crash of May 6 in 2010 produced the largest ever intraday point decline
of Dow Jones of almost 1000 points. This event affected many stocks, some of
them loosing almost their entire value, others rising by more than a factor of
one thousand [12]. As the shock appeared too fast for human intervention,
some market transactions have been rescinded later that day, and later market
regulation established upper bounds for price movements in short periods [14].
There is also a large number of less drastic mini flash crashes, usually in
only one stock at a time [15, 16, 17]. The reasons of flash crashes are discussed
controversially. Explanations include imbalanced liquidity [18, 19, 20], market
manipulation [21], and large orders are discussed as triggers, from mistyped
fat finger trades to intermarket sweep orders [16]. A special focus is on HFT
[22, 23, 13, 24], especially because on short time scales algorithmic feedbacks
could be dominating, without possibility for human intervention. Johnson et
al.[13] find 18 520 Ultrafast Extreme Events (UEEs) using a criterion described
below. They regard HFT as a potential cause for financial crises [25]. On
the other hand, it has been pointed out that such price jumps without incoming
new information are typical for price processes in general [26, 27], even including
human participation.
Another open question is the impact of flash crashes. While the prices after
the big flash crash of 2010 recovered rapidly [28], the crash still demonstrated
extreme risks for investors which are hard to evaluate and to handle [12]. The
fast price recovery of flash crashes implies that they can be considered as bursts
of volatility rather than as price jumps [29]. Anyhow, the price recovery after
mini flash crashes has so far not been systematically evaluated. A comparison
of recovery times with the usual price impact of market orders [30, 31, 32] could
be interesting.
In an attempt to contribute to a clarification of these issues, we have a closer
look on the interplay between UEEs and HFT by using order flow data [33, 34].
We test how often single trades dominate the flash crashes. If this happens often,
most flash crashes occur without an algorithmic feedback as discussed in [13].
Furthermore we analyze, how often the price is restored to levels close to the
price before the flash crash, and compare our findings with the common price
impact of market orders [30]. The paper is organized as follows. We present our
statistical analysis in Results. We discuss which mechanisms trigger UEES in
Mechanism for UEEs. Finally, we analyze the impact of UEEs on the further
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development of traded prices in Impact and recovery of UEEs. We conclude our
findings in Discussion.
2. Results
In Data set and general statistical properties we introduce our data set and
the criteria used to identify UEEs. Moreover we focus on statistical aspects of
UEEs. When did they occur predominantly? Which stocks and stock exchanges
are most effected? Do these events occur simultaneously across different stocks
and stock exchanges? What is the typical size of these events?
2.1. Data set and general statistical properties
We consider a data set of trades and quotes for all stocks of the S&P 500
which were continously traded during 2007 and 2008. The data set was ac-
quired from the NYSE Group [36] (“TAQ Database Release 3.0“) and contains
data with a timestamp precision of one second on the following stock exchanges:
American Stock Exchange (today: NYSE MKT), Archipelago Exchange (today:
NYSE Arca), BATS Global Markets, Boston Stock Exchange (today: NASDAQ
OMX BX), Chicago Stock Exchange, International Securities Exchange, NAS-
DAQ Stock Market, NASDAQ ADF (Alternative Display Facility), National
Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange and Philadelphia Stock Exchange
(today: NASDAQ OMX PHLX). To deal with the limited timestamp precision,
we arranged trades with the same timestamp equidistantly within the second
they occur.
The trades data offer sufficient information for detecting the occurrence of
UEEs. Those that are detected on larger time scales such as so called break-
downs[35] are excluded in this analysis. Here we use the commonly employed
criterion put forward by Nanex [15], where an UEE occurs whenever the traded
price changes monotonously by at least 0.8 percent within 1.5 seconds and at
least ten trades. Thereby we refer to a flash crash (spike) when the price moves
in negative (positive) direction.
Following the above mentioned UEE criterion we find 5529 UEEs in our
dataset. Table 1 groups them according to the industrial sectors. It is remark-
able that the financial sector clearly dominates with 33.35 events per company
on average, followed by the energy sector with 14.36 and the telecommunication
service sector with 12.14. In addition, the standard deviation is extremely high
for firms in the financial sector: for instance, the stock of Morgan Stanley (MS)
exhibits 717 such UEEs during 2007 and 2008. Furthermore Table 2 shows that
there are seconds in time in which more than one UEE occurs. In all of these
cases the UEEs occur in different stocks within the same seconds. For exam-
ple, the probability that more than one UEE occurs within a second is about
9 %. At 10:35:01 on the 10th of December 2008 eight UEEs occured within
one second on different stocks and stock exchanges which were APC (Anadarko
Petroleum Corp.) on New York Stock Exchange, BHI (Baker Hughes Inc.) on
BATS Global Markets, CAM (Cameron International Corp.) on BATS Global
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Markets, NE (Noble Corp.) on Archipelago Exchange, NOV (National Oilwell
Varco Inc.) on Archipelago Exchange as well as VLO (Valero Energy) on New
York Stock Exchange, Archipelago Exchange und NASDAQ Stock Market. All
involved companies belong to the energy sector and all eight UEEs were flash
crashes.
industrial sector
(GICS)
number of
companies
number of events
total
per
company
standard
deviation
Consumer Discretionary 79 508 6.43 5.76
Consumer Staples 38 122 3.21 2.69
Energy 39 560 14.36 23.08
Financials 77 2568 33.35 84.51
Health Care 48 249 5.19 5.75
Industrials 61 274 4.49 7.27
Information Technology 65 486 7.48 8.35
Materials 31 362 11.68 19.49
Telecommunications Services 7 85 12.14 12.51
Utilities 33 315 9.55 42.14
Table 1: Occurrences of UEEs depending on their industrial sector (as per Global Industry
Classification Standard). For every sector we calculate the total and average number of
occurrences as well as the corresponding standard deviation.
UEEs within one second 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
occurrences 4514 372 50 16 6 2 1 1
Table 2: Total amount of UEEs within one second in which at least one UEE occurs. This
listing is not accumulative.
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The absolute count of all UEE occurrences is shown in Fig. 1. We see an
enormous increase of UEEs at the beginning of the financial crisis in September
and October 2008, 46.5 % of the observed UEEs are flash crashes, hence 53.5 %
of them are flash spikes. These observations corroborate the results of Golub et
al. [37, 16], who used a similar data set. To determine the UEE size, i.e. the
price deviation between the beginning and the end of an UEE, we have to define
what the end of an UEE is.
Figure 1: Absolute count on a logarithmic scale of all UEE occurrences versus time with a
bin size of one week. At the end of the third and at the beginning of the last quarter in 2008,
the number of UEEs virtually explodes due to the financial crisis.
In our study the first trade after an UEE either reverses the price trend or
occurs after an at least one second lasting trading pause, whichever happens
earlier. The former trigger applies in 78.3 % of all cases, whereas the latter
ratio is 21.7 %. The UEE size histogram in Fig. 2 clearly reflects the 8h UEE
criterion. As an average relative price jump we calculate −13.9h and 15.3h,
respectively, and the probability for a larger price jump than 5 % is 1.1 % for
flash crashes and 1.68 % for flash spikes.
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Figure 2: Absolute count of all UEE occurrences versus the relative price deviations on a
linear scale with a bin size of 0.001. The gap around zero is due to the UEE criterion. The
double arrows indicate the direction of the price change.
2.2. Mechanism for UEEs
We consider two opposing scenarios that generate UEEs. First, if — in case
of a flash crash (spike) — the best bid (ask) during an UEE decreases (increases)
abruptly from one time step to the next, a large sell (buy) market order has to be
the reason for this extreme event. Second and in contrast, if the corresponding
best value changes in minor price jumps, small market orders have created this
UEE. Since these events occur within a few milliseconds, only the first scenario
can be caused by a human trader, whereas many minor market orders within a
very short time interval can only be placed by high frequent trading algorithms.
In this context, we exclude a random “coherent” synchronization by human
traders induced by an external information that could theoretically also lead to
the same scenario.
To determine which effect dominates, we calculate for each UEE the largest
price jump of the best bid or the best ask, respectively. The results are shown
in Fig. 3. In 57 % (60 %) of all flash crash (spike) events there is one market
order that causes a return of at least 0.5 %. Moreover, in 40 % (45 %) of the
cases, a single market order leads to a price jump that is big enough to fulfill
the 8h UEE criterion. This shows that huge market orders play a major role
in the emergence of UEEs. Hence all traders, not only high frequent traders,
are able to induce an UEE. Furthermore these findings can be interpreted in
context of the results of Golub et al.[16]: with a similar dataset these authors
find 67.85% of all UEEs to be initiated by so called Intermarket Sweep Orders
(ISOs). Although we are not able to identify ISOs this observation supports our
conclusion that large market orders are the main trigger for UEEs since ISOs
typically result in one single huge trade event.
Which stocks are vulnerable to UEEs? — We compare (not shown) typical
order book snapshots of GS (Goldman Sachs Group Inc.) and AAPL (Apple
6
Figure 3: Absolute count of all flash crash (spike) occurrences on a linear scale each represented
by its largest best bid (ask) price jump.
Inc.). GS has 124 UEEs in 2008 and AAPL only has nine. We see that the order
book of GS has many empty price levels whereas the order book of AAPL is
densely populated. A large market order would therefore lead to a larger price
jump for GS than the same market order would do for AAPL. We conclude that
UEEs are rare for AAPL because the stock is very liquid and market orders
would have to be very big and costly to generate UEEs.
2.3. Impact and recovery of UEEs
A further step to a better understanding of UEEs is the observation of the
price behavior after the UEEs’ have reached their extreme values. For every
UEE we calculate the crash/spike recovery rate ηn. As illustrated in Fig. 4, we
denote by t(UEE)0 the time at which the UEE sets in, by t
(rec)
0 the time at which
the recovery sets in and by t(rec)n the time at which the n-th trade after beginning
of the recovery occurs. The corresponding stock prices are S(t(UEE)0 ), S(t
(rec)
0 )
and S(t(rec)n ). We introduce the crash/spike recovery rate by the definition
ηn =
S(t(rec)0 )− S(t(rec)n )
S(t(rec)0 )− S(t(UEE)0 )
. (1)
Thus, ηn describes how much the UEE has recovered up to trade n, ηn = 0
means the stock price has not recovered and is the same as S(t(rec)0 ) whereas
ηn = 1 indicates that there was a full recovery and the stock price is equal
to S(t(UEE)0 ). Of course, ηn can be greater than one or less than zero as well,
because S(t(rec)0 ) and S(t
(UEE)
0 ) are not subject to boundaries.
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Figure 4: Price time series of a typical UEE (AAPL, NASDAQ, 01.12.2008) to illustrate the
definition of the recovery rate ηn. The vertical lines mark the specific instances t
(UEE)
0 , t
(rec)
0
and t
(rec)
n in time.
Figure 5 shows the histograms for all crashes or spikes, respectively, and
1 ≤ n ≤ 50. While in both cases it is most likely that the stock price stays
at the UEE extremum directly after the event, there are also cases in which it
recovers immediately. Over the next trades, the histogram blurs considerably
which is plausible as trading continues. Large price recovery even after a few
trades is in sharp contrast with long lasting price impacts of market orders, see
Bouchaud et al.[30]. Even the impact of more complex market influences, as for
example effective market orders consisting of many smaller market orders, are
known to have long lasting market impacts [32].
Figure 5: Absolute count of all flash crashes (spikes) as level curves over the plane of recovery
rate ηn and number of trades n (with 1 ≤ n ≤ 50) after the end of the UEE. (Due to better
visualization an empty line is added for n = 0.)
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Furthermore we also calculate the probability for ηn ≥ 0.8 and ηn ≤ 0.2
crash/spike recovery rates as function of n to answer the question: How likely
is an UEE to almost recover or tendentially remain at their extremum? The
results are shown in Fig. 6. We see that as more trades go by, it becomes more
likely that an UEE recovers by at least 80 %. In contrast the probability of not
recovering decreases until n = 30, but then constantly about 30 % of these UEEs
recover by less than 20 %. Unexpectedly, the amount of recovered flash crashes
decreases for about five trades before it starts to increase monotonously. This
indicates that in about at least 2% of the UEEs a flash crash is closely spaced
by downward price trends that might be considered as “aftershocks” of the
respective extreme event. This does not seem to be the case for the flash spikes.
Figure 6: Probabilities P (ηn ≥ 0.8) and P (ηn ≤ 0.2) for the event “UEE is recovered by at
least 80 % or 20 %, respectively” versus the number n of trades after the end of the UEE for
flash crashes (black) and flash spikes (gray).
3. Discussion
We found a total number of 5529 UEEs in 2007 and 2008. The financial
sector clearly dominated with an average of 33.35 UEEs per company. Our
analysis supports the observation that stocks with lower liquidity are more likely
to generate large price changes which can lead to UEEs. Differentiating between
flash crashes and flash spikes, the probability to observe the latter is higher by
7%. Concerning the frequency of UEEs it is not uncommon to find more than
one UEE per second. In fact the probability for this to occur is approximately
9%. Especially in times of financial crisis the total frequency of UEEs surges as
also found by Johnson et al.[13].
To analyse the mechanism that leads to the occurence of UEEs we distin-
guished between two microscopic interpretations. On the one hand the scenario
put forward by Johnson et al.[13] includes a new all-machine phase in which
many small market orders occur that — considering the time scale — can only
be linked to HFT. On the other hand we assumed that already large market or-
ders would be able to cause the observed price changes within a typical UEE, in
agreement with Golub et al.[16]. This would conversely indicate that not only
algorithmic but also human traders could trigger UEEs. In our analysis this
9
interpretation is substantiated by the fact that about 60% of the UEEs contain
one market order that already generates a return of 0.5%. In contrast to the
first scenario that considers UEEs as completely driven by HFT, the observation
that large market orders play a major role shows that this has not necessarily to
be the case. Thus, our analysis does not corroborate the conclusions of Johnson
et al.[13]. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile mentioning that the time resolution in
our analysis was limited to one second. It is thus desirable to carry out such an
analysis with millisecond accuracy.
Having investigated possible causes of UEEs we studied their impact on the
subsequent trading. As one would anticipate the amount of recovering UEEs
rises with the total number of trades ahead. Nevertheless a fraction of 30% of
all UEEs recover less than 20% with respect to the price level before the UEE
occurs.
Regarding the fact that about 25% of the UEEs are almost recovered after
one trade, there must be processes in the order book dynamics that lead to this
observation. At this point one could argue that this should be linked to different
types of UEEs with respect to their impact on the following trades which one
could try to classify, as an extension to already existing allocations as suggested
by Nokerman[17]. The fast price recovery indicates that flash crashes do not
reflect the perceptions of investors, but are rather short lasting accidents which
are rapidly repaired, see also Christensen et al.[29]. Interesting further questions
in this direction are the long term price impact, the impact of a flash crash in
one stock on the price of other stocks [38], and aftershocks [39].
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